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The Williams Amendments: An Evaluation of the Early Returns
The purpose of this note is to examine the judicial interpretation
of the Williams Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act. The
background of the legislation is outlined to direct attention to its
general purpose and to isolate its intended beneficiaries.' A discussion
of the actual amendments will provide the informational base necessary
for consideration of the recent cases. The critical discussion of the first
few cases interpreting the amendments provides the foundation for a
suggested approach in applying the available remedies to violators of
the Williams Amendments.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The Williams Bill,2 enacted in 1968, amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)3 and provided explicit regulations in
three areas that previously were subsumed under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act.4 Cases involving two of the three areas have now been
decided-(1) the cash tender offer and (2) a preliminary move to a
tender offer when a person or group of persons acquires ten percent of
the stock in an attempt to gain control through a creeping acquisition.
The third area regulated is issuer repurchases of stock.
The Williams Bill was the result of tempering an earlier version
that characterized tender offerors as "white collar pirates who reduce
proud old companies" to mere shells by trading off the best assets and
splitting up the loot.' The concern over the willy-nilly liquidation of
ready cash and quick assets is more apparent than real. 7 It is now more
probable that the tremendous increase in tender offers is not due to the
wasting of proud old companies by white collar pirates, but rather is
a component of the larger trend toward corporate conglomeration. The
attitudes increasing the number of acquisitions include: (I) the current
1. For a discussion of the bill prior to its enactment, see Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids
and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149 (1966); Manne, Cash Tender Offers For
Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE L.J. 231; Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St. George From the Dragon, HARV. J. LEuls. 431 (1968).
2. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act].
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); see Note, Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under the
Federal Securities Laws: A New Challenge For lOb-S. 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 359 (1966).
5. S. 2731, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
6. See 111 CoNG. REc. 28257-60 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams, D-N.J.).
7. In one survey, 2/3's of the acquiring firms retained at least 75% of the purchased assets
5 years after the completion of the acquisition. Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids,
45 HARv. Bus. REV., March-April, 1967, at 135, 138.
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inflationary spiral which encourages the purchase of existing assets
rather than the expense of constructing new facilities; (2) the immediate
acquisition of an assembled staff; (3) a new respectability for cash bids;
and (4) diversification which eases the effects of a cyclical demand in
a given product line because its performance can be set off against that
of an unrelated product line.8 Tight money has recently slowed the
number of bids but the outlook is for a continuation of the trend.'
Further, the activity of the Fortune 500 lions in the acquisition arena
has absorbed many of the willing merger partners; proxy fights are
expensive; so the cash tender offer becomes more attractive.'0
With the increase in mergers and acquisitions, the identification of
takeover candidates has become more difficult due to the diminishing
supply. This has led some brokerage houses to make a market in the
specialized information concerning potential target companies. The
Senate has recently announced an investigation into possible conflicts
of interests since the brokerage house normally collects a large finder's
fee for the sale of the information, and in-addition, up to four
commissions on the transactions involved in the consummation of a
takeover."
The paradigm takeover candidate features a low price to earnings
ratio as a reflection of a significantly lower return on shareholder's
equity than that exhibited by industry competitors. Often a declining
dividend payout is present because of the disappointing profits. In
addition, the candidate should have surplus liquid assets. A large
unused debt capacity-long term debt to shareholder's equity ratio-is
8. See generally Bjork, The Merger and Tender Movements-An Economic Evaluation in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TAKEOVER BIDS, PROXY CONTESTS AND TRANSACTIONS IN
CONTROL-SEC AND OTHER ASPECTS 51 (J. Fom, Chairman 1968).
9. Metz, Market Place: Tender Offers: Revival Is Seen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1969, at 64,
col. 7. In 1968 at least 250 corporations experienced some kind of tender offer, raid, or merger
bid. Vance, Is your company a take-over target?, 47 HARV. Bus. REV., May-June, 1969, at 93.
10. Textron, Litton, and FMC have been followed by Teledyne, Whitaker, Gulf & Western,
Walter Kidde, SCM Corp., and others without even considering American Electric Power Co.,
W.R. Grace, Xerox, Bristol Myers, RCA, and General Motors. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 7,
at 138; see Bjork, supra note 8.
11. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1970, at 1, col. 6 (southwest ed.) (Senate investigation
into brokers and mutual fund activities with respect to the Leasco Data takeover of Reliance
Insurance Co.). Typically the research department of a brokerage house will identify a potential
takeover candidate. A partner armed with this knowledge may inform the target, but will surely
inform his big clients, usually institutions, of the bargain price and potential takeover. Having
obtained the usual brokerage commission on the sales to the institutions, the broker then
approaches a big conglomerate with his find and his knowledge of where large blocks of stock
are placed. He then collects a finder's fee if the deal is consummated and a double commission
if he acts as a depository for the shares. A fourth commission is generated after the broker
reinvests the proceeds received by the institutional investor.
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also indicative of a possible takeover candidate. Another attractive
feature is a conservative valuation of assets.'
The cash tender offer has been the most effective takeover
method.' 3 Because of the shift in power from the owners of
corporations to the technostructilre and the proxy rules promulgated
under section 14 of the 1934 Act, 4 the proxy contest is extremely
difficult.' s The stock tender offer is burdensome because it is subject
to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.16 Even
before specific regulation of cash tender offers by the Williams
Amendments, incumbent management had a variety of defensive
weapons from which to choose. It could split the stock, raise the
dividend, 7 repurchase shares,' launch a publicity campaign," make a
counteractive takeover, or undertake a defensive merger, for example
with a competitor of the offeror to raise potential antitrust
infractions.2 1 Consequently, two-thirds of the takeover attempts via the
most successful method have been defeated .
2
12. See generally Vance, supra note 9, at 94-97.
13. For a discussion of the various acquisitive methods available in the quest for corporate
control, see Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
317 (1967).
14. 1934 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
15. Even with the Teapot Dome oil scandal and the ample resources of John D. Rockefeller,
the ouster of the delinquent management of Standard Oil of Indiana was barely accomplished.
J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 77-80 (1967). The proxy contest is also very
expensive. In the New York Central proxy fight, it was reported that the victorious insurgents
spent $1,308,000.00 and management spent $825,000.00. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1956, at 33, col.
5.
16. 1933 Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1964); see L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
513 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
17. Proposed SEC Rule 10b-12, 33 Fed. Reg. 4632 (1968), would limit target companies'
dividend boost if there was not a sufficient cash surplus to warrant a dividend distribution, It
may be that the increase of a dividend is a manipulative device within SEC Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as lob-5]. See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco,
Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (injunction issued to prevent price manipulation through
depressed dividend policy); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(decrease of dividend to affect market price violates SEC Rule lOb-5).
19. The brutality of a heated campaign is demonstrated by a full page advertisement in the
Wall Street Journal which screamed "World's First Comic Prospectus. Read about 'Funny
Money,' How Emerson Turned the Profit Corner, and Other Factual but Hilarious Stuff." Wall
Street Journal, July 1, 1969, at 11. Publicity of this type would now be subject to § 14(e) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1969). Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers,
Inc., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,557 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1970) (§ 14(e) applies to stock
tender offer).
20. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 7, at 142-47. For a general discussion of these defensive
tactics, see Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-over Bids -Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1967);
Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Management in Contesting Tender Offers, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1104 (1969).
21. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 7, at 135, 137. One study found that from 1966 to the
first quarter of 1968, 8 of every 10 tender offers failed. FORBES, April 1, 1967, at 60.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission)
submitted recommendations which were incorporated as amendments
to the original bill. 2. Their intent was to eliminate the advantage that
cash tender offers had over proxy fights and stock tender offers, and
make symmetrical the regulation of the various acquisitive methods.
Following hearings before the Subcommittee on Securities of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 3 substantially all of the
Williams Bill24 was enacted as amendments to sections 13 and 14 of
the 1934 Act.2 The Commission has maintained that these provisions
were "intended to provide full disclosure [for the benefit of investors]
without tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management
or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. .... ,,21
Prior to the enactment of the Williams Amendments there was a
paucity of case law on cash tender offers.27 The "Birnbaum Doctrine,"
which declared that a civil action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act28
may be maintained only by a purchaser or seller of securities,2 9
precluded either the target corporation 30 or the nontendering
22. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Committee on
Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, on S. 2731, 112 CONG. REC. 19003 (1966).
23. Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
24. A 5-day pre-offer disclosure period where the offeror would disclose all the information
required on Schedule 13D to the target and Commission was deleted as was the requirement of a
pro-rata take-up of all the shares tendered throughout the duration of the offer. As enacted shares
tendered only during the initial 10 days are taken up pro-rata when the offer is for less than all
of the class outstanding. The right to withdraw tendered shares was limited to the first 7 days of
the offer and after the offer has been open for 60 days.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (Supp IV, 1969). There is some concern that by adding § 2
of the Williams Bill to § 14 of the 1934 Act which regulates proxy solicitation that the
amendments will be a trap for the unwary. While cash tender offers are frequently an alternative
to a proxy contest, they are different in that they involve a purchase of shares. Thus § 2 might
have been more appropriately placed under § 10 of the 1934 Act. See Hearings, supra note 23,
at 142 (statement of Professor Painter).
26. Memorandum of the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5, Pan American Sulphur Co. v.
Susquehanna Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,473 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969),
on appeal, No. 27920 (5th Cir. 1970), quoting H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1968); Hearings. supra note 23, at 183-84. A more direct method might have been to require the
target company to furnish a shareholder list of the offeror company if the shareholder is really the
intended beneficiary of these provisions. Id. at 165-75.
27. For both citation and discussion of relevant cases in this area, see Andrews, The
Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1965);
Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REv. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in
Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1956).
28. 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
29. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
30. E.g., Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. D. Kaltman & Co., 283 F. Supp. 763, 765
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shareholder from asserting a private right of action under Rule lOb-
5.31 While some observers thought, and the Commission hoped, that
Birnbaum had met its demise,32 the vitality of the doctrine has been
very recently reasserted.33 Professor Loss defends Birnbau M, 31 and feels
that the two cases that seriously challenge Birnbaum 31 demonstrate
only that there need not be privity between plaintiff and defendant.36
In addition, the tender offeror had never been under a duty to disclose
to tendering shareholders since the information upon which he made
his offer came from sources external to the target corporation."
II. THE WILLIAMS AMENDMENTS
A. Parties and Securities Involved
Section 13(d)38 requires reporting the information on Schedule
13 D39 once any person has acquired directly or indirectly" more than
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956, 957 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see
Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (temporary restraining order
issued and target held to have standing to sue for injunction). The court did not cite or discuss
Birnbaum or related cases.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). Significantly the language "in connection with a
purchase or sale of any security" upon which the Birnbaum limitation of lob-5 was based is
omitted from § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1964), which is the antifraud provision.
32. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Job-5, 54 VA. L.
REv. 268 (1968).
33. The Commission as amicus curiae urged that Birnbaum be overruled in a recent case
which applied the doctrine to deny standing to an offeror corporation which had been unable to
purchase any shares due to the false and misleading statements of the target corporation. Iroquois
Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1969); see Greenstein v. Paul,
400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968). But see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787 (2d Cir. 1969), noted in 23 VAND. L. REv. 885 (1970).
34. 3 Loss at 1469; 6 Loss at 3617.
35. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967) (broker held to be a
purchaser with standing to sue customer who placed orders for stock and refused to pay for it);
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (nonten-
dering shareholder left only with appraisal rights in a subsequent short-form merger held to be a
forced seller). The court in Vine specifically found it "unnecessary to deal with [the] interesting
contention" advanced by the Commission as amicus curiae that the plaintiff need not be a
purchaser or seller to sue under lOb-5. 374 F.2d at 636.
36. 3 Lossat 1767-71.
37. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951); cf. Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (plaintiffs who purchased stock in target after
tender offer in which the offeror obtained 94% of target's shares had no claim for damages under
10(b) but could enjoin manipulation of the present market price through a depressed dividend
policy).
38. 1934 Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969).
40. "Indirectly" may invoke the attribution policy of § 16(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a) (1964). See note 154 infra and accompanying text.
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ten percent of any equity security of a class which is registered under
section 12 of the 1934 Act."' The term "person" includes any
association, group, syndicate, or just two or more persons who act as
a partnership for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of
securities of an issuer.4 2 The concept of a group is unresolved presently
but apparently an all-inclusive definition is contemplated. 3 Section
14(d), 44 which is applicable to the cash tender offer for equity securities
registered under section 12, requires the filing by the offeror of a
statement containing the information and exhibits required by Schedule
13D and the filing of Schedule 14D 4 by the management of the target
if it wishes to make a recommendation to its shareholders.
It might be argued that sections 14(d)(5), which permits
withdrawal of the tendered security during the first seven days and after
60 days of the tender offer;46 14(d)(6), which requires pro rata
acceptance within the first ten days of an offer if it is for less than all
the outstanding equity securities and a greater number is deposited;41
and 14(d)(7), which gives to all who tender the benefit of any
subsequent increase in the price offered for the securities during the
offer,48 apply to all tender offers irrespective of whether the target
security is registered under section 12. Reading the section in its
entirety, however, it would appear that the limitation to registered
securities in section 14(d)(l) applies'across the board to all subsections
of 14(d). There is also the unresolved question of whether equity
security includes convertible debt.
B. Disclosure Requirements
Anyone who acquires directly or indirectly ten percent of any class
of registered equity security, or who is about to embark on a cash
tender offer must file Schedule 13D which requires the disclosures
discussed in the following paragraphs. 9
41. 1934 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964).
42. 1934 Act § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
43. See notes 145-47, 151-57 infra and accompanying text.
44. 1934 Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1969).
46. 1934 Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969).
47. 1934 Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (Supp. IV, 1969).
48. 1934 Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (Supp. IV, 1969).
49. Section 13(d)(5)(A) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(5)(A) (Supp. IV, 1969),
exempts from the operation of the filing requirements "any acquisition or offer to acquire
securities made or proposed to be made by means of registration statement under the Securities
Act of 1933." Presumably adequate disclosure would result from procedure under the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act]. Senator Williams, D-
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1. Background and Identity of Purchaser.-This provision and
rules adopted by the Commission require a corporation making the
disclosure to file information about the corporation, its officers,
directors, and controlling shareholders.50 This provision is probably
more for the benefit of the Commission than the shareholder. While
the shareholder may be more apt to respond to the usually offered
increment above market price than to the identity of the offeror, few
would dispute his right to know the identity of the purchaser, especially
where the offer is for control.-' The shareholder should have the
information with which to assess the corporation's future in the hands
of the incumbent management or the acquiring party. The burden of
disclosure of identity is minimal. The New York Stock Exchange
previously required listed companies to disclose the identity of the
principal making the offer.52
2. Source of Funds.-If funds have been borrowed from other
than a United States banking institution in the ordinary course of
business for the purpose of acquiring and holding the shares, a
description of the transaction and the names of the parties must be
furnished. 53 Those in opposition argue that this provision is unfortunate
N.J., introduced S. 3431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), to lower the 10% requirement to 5% because
the practice has developed of purchasing 9% of the stock prior to the making of the tender offer
and thereby avoiding the reporting requirements of §§ 13(d) and 16(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),
78p(a) (1964). Supp. IV, 1969). The new bill would lilso specifically include insurance companies
since they are now "at the mercy of the secret takeover bid" by virtue of their exemption from
the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. 116 CONG. REc. § 1533-34 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1970).
He introduced his bill because "between 1946 and 1966 only five companies with assets exceeding
$250 million were acquired [by cash tender offer, while] in 1967, six such acquisitions took place
In 1968, [that] number doubled." Id. He feels that 10% owners are a controlling interest,
apparently not recalling the tremendous battle that John D. Rockefeller, a 14% "controlling
interest" had to wage to retire the chief executive officer of Standard Oil for his activities in the
Teapot Dome scandal. See J. GALBRAITH, supra note 15, at 77-80.
50. 1934 Act § 13(d)(l)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(A) (Supp. IV, 1969); Item 2, Schedule
13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969). The regulations require disclosure of: names, business
addresses and principal occupations for the past 10 years, and whether such person has been
convicted in a "criminal proceeding" within the past 10 years. SEC Rule 14d-l, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-1(4) (1969). Apparently since the language of 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969),
requires a criminal proceeding only to be disclosed, neither liability in an SEC disciplinary hearing
nor an injunction issued for violation of the securities laws need be disclosed.
51. Professor Manne unabashedly disputes the shareholders' right to know. He feels that
the disclosure of the identity of the offeror hampers the control market. Manne, supra note 1, at
243-46.
52. Hearings, supra note 23, at 87 (Donald Calvin, Vice-president of the New York Stock
Exchange).
53. 1934 Act § 13(d)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1969); Item 3, Schedule
13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969). The regulation does not exempt banks as the statute does.
It is unlikely that the Commission would be able to restrict the words of the statute.
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in that the shareholder really doesn't care from whom the money
comes as long as he is paid. The New York Stock Exchange had
previously required an assurance of financial ability to purchase the
shares sought; this is about the limit of the shareholders' concern.54 The
Commission and other government agencies are interested in the
sources of funds, however, since this sometimes reveals the real party
in interest. 55 There is also the suspicion that cash tender offers may be
serving as the laundry for the gains accumulated by the more notorious
activities of organized crime. 6
While loans from banks are exempted, Congress has been
criticized for failing to consider that other financial institutions, such
as pension funds and insurance companies, can be subjected to
pressures similar to those of a banking institution, thus, the reason for
exempting banks from the regulation is equally applicable to the other
institutions.5 Another criticism is that the phrase "in the ordinary
course of business" is nowhere defined in the statute or regulations.
There is also the problem of the proximate relationship of the loan to
the acquisition. It may be that a person would consider a loan that was
made prior in time or for another purpose unrelated to cash generated
from internal sources to be used for the acquisition while the
Commission would not.
3. The Purpose of the Transaction .- The fourth item, potentially
the most hazardous to the continuing vitality of any takeover attempt,
is the statement of the purpose of the transaction. If the purpose of the
transaction is to control the target, the offeror must disclose his future
plans with respect to the assets.5" This requirement gives the incumbent
management an advantage in that they are free to change policy since
they need not disclose their plans as a condition precedent to making
a recommendation to the shareholders on the tender offer. Thus, the
incumbent management can usurp the benefit of the presumably more
efficient plan of the offeror for the use of the business assets without
incurring the cost of planning. Competitors of the target will also be
greatly interested in any new deployment of the target corporation's
assets.
The offeror is operating from outside the corporation at the time he
is formulating his plans; thus, what would seem reasonable without the
54. Hearings, supra note 23, at 87 (Donald Calvin).
55. Id. at 182 (Manuel Cohen, then Chairman of the SEC).
56. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1965, at 57, col. I.
57. Hearings, supra note 23, at 58 (Professor Samuel Hayes); id. at 127 (Arthur Fleisher).
58. 1934 Act § 13(d)(l)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (Supp. IV, 1969); Item 4, Schedule
13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969).
1970]
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insider's knowledge of the corporation may be a totally unacceptable
mode of operation once control has actually changed hands." It is
probable, however, that definite plans have been made because the
lending ingtitution is looking to a combined balance sheet for security.
It will therefore require apprisal of future plans prior to making the
loan commitment.
The reason behind the requirement of disclosure of future plans is
the fear that the offeror is seeking the assets primarily, for their
liquidation or sale value. As discussed earlier, this is probably not the
case in practice. Even if it were, liquidating a failing company often
serves a valuable purpose in minimizing the shareholders' losses and
precluding the consumption of any accumulated earnings." Thus,
liquidation is not always undesirable from the shareholders' point of
view.
It is probable that skillful lawyers will attempt to circumvent the
law with nebulous statements of purpose such as those that are found
in corporate charters. The Commission really should have little concern
with the reason for the acquisition so long as an orderly market is
maintained. Thus, it should be an allowable practice for the offeror to
disclose his purpose to the extent of whether he is purchasing for
investment or seeking control, but beyond that only a general, all-
inclusive statement should be required. 6 Otherwise minority
shareholders might try to hold management to the policies enunciated
in the statement when later business circumstances dictate significant
changes." The offeror may also be denied the benefit of his acquisition 3
or be liable for false or misleading statements under section 10(b) or
section 14(e) of the 1934 Act.
4. Other Items.-The offeror must disclose the number of shares
of the target which he owns directly or indirectly either by himself or
through his associates,"' and any contracts, arrangements, or
understandings such as options, proxy arrangements or loans, with any
59. Leasco Data Processing Corporation's experience with Pergamon Press, Ltd., is
illustrative of how misinformed an offeror can be. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 20, 1970, at 3,
col. 4 (southwest ed.).
60. Professor Manne is a staunch defender of the corporate liquidator, although he would
prefer to use the term corporate redeemer. Manne, supra note 1, at 236-37 n. 14.
61. See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 7, at 144.
62. Cf United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 91,288 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963).
63. Pan American Sulphur Co. v. Susquehanna Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 92,473 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969), on appeal, No. 27920 (5th Cir. 1970).
64. 1934 Act § 13(d)(l)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(D) (Supp. IV, 1969); Item 5, Schedule
13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969).
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person with respect to any securities of the target corporation. 5 These
disclosure provisions certainly relate to valid shareholder interests.
However, to be balanced against these interests is the fact that they
may provide another basis for superficial actions seeking injunction or
damages that may ruin the tender offer before the action is
subsequently dismissed. The terms "direct or indirect ownership" may
present a potential trap in view of the all-inclusive definition of
"group" in section 13(d)(2)."
C. Target Company Disclosure
Ostensibly the Williams Amendments were not to tip the scales in
the favor of America's proud old companies. Yet unless the target
company makes a recommendation to its shareholders, it can
completely avoid the operation of the amendments. The regulation of
the target company was passed on to the Commission under section
14(d)(4), which gives the Commission the authority to promulgate such
rules and regulations with respect to solicitation or recommendation to
the holders of a security to accept or reject a tender offer. The
Commission has responded with Rule 14d-4.17 In. effect, the target
management, as. a condition to commenting on the offer, must disclose
the reasons for opposition. Its statements are circumscribed by the
antifraud limitation of section 14(e).6 8 Management must also disclose
any arrangement the person filing the statement has with either the
issuer or tender offeror19 The Commission feels that the rulemaking
power will regulate the defending management and bring order to an
area where formerly misleading statements were made with impunity.
D. The Antifraud Provision
Section 14(e) applies to all parties and all statements made in both
cash and stock tender offers. 70 The conspicuous absence of the language
65. 1934 Act § 13(d)(l)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(E) (Supp. IV, 1969); Item 6, Schedule
13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969).
66. See notes 145-47, 151-57 infra and accompanying text.
67. SEC Rule No. 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1969). However, a communication from
an issuer to its shareholders which does no more than state that management is studying the offer
and requests shareholders to defer making a determination until they have received the
recommendation of management which must be given by at least 10 days prior to the close of
the offer is exempted by SEC Rule No. 14d-2(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(f) (1969).
68. 1934 Act § 14(e), 15 U.S..C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV, 1969).
69. For a discussion of the target management's duty to make a recommendation with the
concomitant disclosure requirement, see Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target Company's Duty of
Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAw. 455 (1970).
70. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., [Current] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. § 92,557 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1970) (§ 14(e) applies to a stock tender offer).
19701
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
"in connection with a purchase or sale" will give standing to
nontendering shareholders, target corporations, and the offeror, in the
rare case where he has been denied the tender of shares because of the
manipulative devices of the target.71 Professor Loss believes that a more
significant omission was the failure to insert the jurisdictional
language. He feels that without a reference to interstate facilities, the
section is open to constitutional attack. 72 For the present, however, it
is apparent that the Birnbaum doctrine has been circumvented for the
cash and stock tender offer situation. 73
E. Other Regulatory Measures
1. Issuer Repurchases.-The issuer of a class of securities
registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act may not repurchase any
security issued by it in contravention of rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission under the grant of authority in section
13(e) to define areas of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practice
and develop the means to prevent such practices.74 Previously this
technique was used by the management of the target corporation to
drive up the price of its stock, 75 or to purchase the interest of the offeror
who threatened to take control. Surprisingly, under state law, if there
was any connection at all with a contemplated change in policy, the
shares held by a threatening outside interest could be purchased, even
at a premium price, with funds of the target corporation. The action
of entrenched management was protected by the "business judgment"
rule.71
Presently, the Commission merely requires disclosure of the
purpose of the transaction, the source of the funds or other
consideration, including a description of the transaction and
identification of all the parties.77 There is no exclusion for banks. In
addition, the antifraud provision of section 14(e) applies to the
71. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969); see note
33 supra.
72. 6Lossat3661.'
73. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
74. 1934 Act § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (Supp. IV, 1969). The scope of the term
"issuer" is presently unclear.
75. Hearings, supra note 23, at 138 (Professor Robert Mundheim). This technique was
limited in that as the target increased its holdings, the offeror's shares represented a larger
proportion of the voting stock.
76. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch.
47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960); Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares-Are There New
Overtones?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 620 (1965).
77. SEC Rule 13e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-! (1969).
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statement of purpose of the transaction; thus, it would appear that
purchases merely for the maintenance of control would no longer be
protected under the "business judgment doctrine."' 8
2. New Shareholder Rights.-The shareholder in whose behalf
the bill was passed is explicitly benefited in that he may withdraw his
shares any time within the first seven days of the. offer or after the offer
has remained open for 60 days." The Commission originally sought an
unlimited withdrawal privilege to allow the shareholder to take
advantage of any competing, higher tender offer. This would have
brought uncertainty to the offeror because he would not be able to
gauge the success of his offer and plan accordingly. The offeror would
then become an insurer of the value of the stock against future decline,
but could not have the benefit of any advance in the market price that
was probably prompted by his offer."0 The compromise withdrawal
period, although it will make tender offers somewhat more expensive
since an element of uncertainty is introduced, is reasonable because it
gives the unsophisticated investor who was immediately attracted by
the opportunity to sell at twenty percent above the market price time
to review his decision and change his mind after management has
responded to the attack with further information or after a competing
tender offer with even more favorable terms has been made.
Another new right given to the shareholder is the benefit of any
increase in price during the term of the offer without regard to whether
the securities were taken up by the offeror prior to the variation in
terms of the tender offer.8 ' The committee report felt that
discrimination in favor of late-tendering shareholders should be
abolished.82 It would appear that the effect is more apparent than real,
however, because the section only applies to changes in terms made
during the tender offer. Thus, a second tender offer, increasing the
consideration, could be made after the conclusion of the first and still
be within the letter of the law.8
78. The authority given to the Commission in § 13(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(c)(1) (Supp.
IV, 1969), is broad enough to allow the Commission to prohibit absolutely issuer repurchases
during the pendency of a tender offer. The House Report recognized that while an issuer
repurchase during an offer period usually would be a manipulative device, there are legitimate
purposes for repurchase. Some examples are: to reduce outstanding shares following a cash sale
of an operating division, or to have shares for use in pension programs, executive options, or
acquisitions. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968).
79. 1934 Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969).
80. Hearings, supra note 23, at 92-93 (letter of the New York Stock Exchange).
81. 1934 Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (Supp. IV, 1969).
82. H.R. REp. No. 1711,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968).
83. The Commission might under its rule-making power in § 14(d)(4), 15
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The third innovative provision was borrowed from the practice of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). This provision requires
companies making a tender offer to take up the shares tendered within
the first ten days on a pro-rata basis when the offer is for less than all
the outstanding shares of a class of stock.84 The ten day pro-rata period
followed by acceptance of shares on a first-come-first-served basis helps
the small shareholder because his shares will be on deposit a shorter
time, and it permits all shareholders to participate in the offer to the
same extent.
The final provision requires the issuer to provide the same
information as required by sections 14(a) and (c) of the 1934 Act if
there is an understanding between the target and the offeror with
respect to the election of a majority of the directors otherwise than by
a meeting of security holders."'
3. Exemptions.-Sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the 1934 Act are
not applicable to acquisitions or offers made or proposed to be made
by means of a registration statement filed under the 1933 Act; 6
acquisitions of less than two percent of the outstanding securities of the
same class during the preceding twelve month period;" acquisitions
made by the issuer of the security;8 or any acquisition or proposed
acquisition that the Commission may by grace exempt providing the
transaction is "not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the
effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer ...."I'
There is not a private offering type exemption as is found in the
1933 Act registration requirements or exemption for initial contacts
prior to the formation of a "group" within section 13(d)(3) as there is
in the rules governing initial stages of a proxy solicitation." It is
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (Supp. IV, 1969), integrate the tender offers where it appeared that the second
offer was merely an extension of the first..
84. NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-180 (1963); Hearings, supra note 23, at 87, 89-90.
85. 1934 Act § 14(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (Supp. IV, 1969).
86. 1934 Act §§ 13(d)(5)(A), 14(d)(8)(A), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(5)(A), 78n(d)(8)(A) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
87. 1934 Act §§ 13(d)(5)(B), 14(d)(8)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(5)(B), 78n(d)(8)(B) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
88. 1934 Act §§ 13(d)(5)(C), 14(d)(8)(C), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(5)(C), 78n(d)(8)(C) (Supp.
IV, 1969). The distinction between equity security as used in § 13(d)(5)(C) and the term security
used in 14(d)(8)(C) seems to be more of a function of the imprecise drafting generally found in the
amendments rather than an attempt to exclude such items as convertible debt in the former
provision but include it in the latter. Issuer repurchases are governed by § 13(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(e) (Supp. IV, 1969).
89. 1934 Act §§ 13 (d)(5)(D), 14(d)(8)(D), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(5)(D), 78n(d)(8)(D)
(Supp. IV, 1969).
90. 1933 Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964); SEC Rule 14a-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
2(a) (1969).
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interesting to note that the Commission Release covering Rule l4d-2
stated that the "exclusions relate to matters such as offers to no more
than ten security holders during any period of twelve months
This exclusion, however, is not found in Rule 14d-2.1
2
III. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. Tender Offer-Standing and Materiality
The first case to be decided under the Williams Amendments, an
action by the target company to enjoin the offeror from voting the
stock acquired in a tender offer and to require divestiture of the stock,
held that there is a private right of action for violation of the
Amendments and that the target corporation is an appropriate party
to bring the action. The court, however, refused to grant the relief
requested.5 The defendant International Controls Corporation (ICC)
generated about 40 million dollars through a private placement of
stock and a sale of Eurobonds to use for acquisitions. ICC authorized
a purchase of 100,000 shares of Electronic Specialty (ELS) through a
bank in the Bahamas." After it had acquired approximately one-half
of that number or about two and one-half percent of the outstanding
shares of ELS, ICC's president proposed a merger. The plaintiff (ELS)
was much larger than ICC and rebuffed its initial overture of merger
on a share-for-share basis. 5 After these talks an article appeared in the
Wall Street Journal which overestimated the size of ICC's position in
ELS stock. On the strength of this statement and a discussion of the
merger, ELS stock reached an all time high. ICC's investment bankers
then advised against a tender offer as being too expensive at the present
time. ELS then announced merger plans with a third company. ICC
91. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968), [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 77,715, at83,638.
92. SEC Rule 14d-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1969).
93. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). A
better perspective of the factual setting can be gained by reading the 2 lower court opinions.
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 296 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (denial
of a motion for a preliminary injunction).
94. As long as ICC owned less than 10% of ELS, it would not have to file Schedule 13D, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969), pursuant to § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1969),
or insider trading reports under § 16(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964). ICC then
avoids any liability on short-swing profits it might make on a sale of ELS shares within 6 months if
the deal falls through. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970), noted in 22 VAND. L. REv. 1003 (1969).
95. 296 F. Supp. at 464. ELS's net earnings in 1967 were $2,630,000.00, or $1.42 per share, as
compared with ICC's earnings of $678,000.00, or $.31 per share.
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reported that merger talks had broken off and that it did not plan to
use its cash for an ELS tender offer. ELS stock began to decline in
price and ICC sold 5,400 shares on the market. On August 13, the ICC
president was interviewed by the Wall Street Journal and stated that
his "preference was to sell our stock in Electronic Specialty." The
Wall Street Journal once again estimated ICC's holdings at twice their
actual size or about five percent of the outstanding shares'of ELS.96
That evening the ICC president advised the board of ICC that a tender
offer should be reconsidered. The interview of August 13 was published
on August 15 after the intervening change of preference. On August 16,
ICC filed Schedule 13 D with the Commission which allegedly failed to
disclose specific plans eventually to merge with ELS. On August 19,
the tender offer for 500,000 shares of ELS was published in New York,
Los Angeles, and San Francisco newspapers. The offer failed to state
that ICC had previously sold a substantial number of shares or that it
had a plan to merge with ELS. The plaintiff instituted an action for
injunction to prevent consummation of the tender offer and moved for
temporary relief. ICC extended the offer and announced that it would
accept all shares tendered. ELS officers stated that if their motion was
denied they would withdraw their former recommendations to the
shareholders, tender their shares, and resign. Judge McLean denied the
injunctive relief. He found the tender offer not misleading, even though
the plaintiff might prevail on the possible manipulative effect of the
August 15 Wall Street Journal interview and the equivocal statement
in Schedule 13D with respect to future plans, inasmuch as ICC had
previously planned a share-for-share merger. The judge had balanced
the hardships to the stockholders of both companies with other
available relief such as a later injunction against voting the stock. 7 The
officers then tendered their shares. Following the denial of the
preliminary injunction, ICC forwarded payment for all the shares
tendered. The checks were accompanied by a copy of the complaint in
the pending action, Judge McLean's opinion, and an offer permitting
any shareholder to withdraw. Few accepted. ICC then moved for a
summary judgment on the ground that ELS lacked standing and that
the tendering and nontendering shareholders had not acted in reliance
upon any statement alleged to be misleading.
At the request of the district court judge, the Commission
96. Dorfman, Heard on the Street, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 1968, at 23, col. 2
(southwest ed.).
97. 296 F. Supp. at 469; see Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840,
843 (2d Cir. 1967).
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submitted a memorandum as amicus curiae vigorously urging that the
target corporation has standing. 5 The position of the Commission and
that adopted by the court was that a cash tender offer is congruent with
a proxy solicitation. The court cited the congressional history of the
proxy rules, which
anticipated protection from 'irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of a
corporation away from honest and conscientious corporation officials.'. . . [T]he
Proxy Rules are shot through with provisions recognizing that in contests for
control the management has a role to play as such and not merely insofar as the
managers are stockholders."
The court concluded that nothing could be "a more appropriate
description of the state of facts that exists in this case."' 00
The lower court seems wrong on two counts. First, the cash tender
offer and the proxy solicitation are not identical. In the cash tender
offer situation an individual is pondering whether the amount offered
is enough to make him part with his stock. The argument that he is
"voting" for present or replacement management by tendering or not
tendering is unacceptable because an individual might refuse the tender
yet hope the offer is successful so that he will retain an interest in the
growth of the company under new management. In the proxy situation,
the primary consideration is not the amount of cash flowing measured
against past prices of the commodity, but rather the qualifications of
the individuals seeking to replace incumbent management. The frame
of reference is not the adequacy of price for termination of interest, but
the presumption of continued equity participation.
Secondly, the amendments ostensibly were to benefit stockholders,
not management-incumbent or insurgent. The Second Circuit
partially recognized the error and attempted to ameliorate the
consequences of an inadequate and erroneous characterization made by
the lower court interested only in reaching what it thought to be a
desirable result.' 0'
A more palatable basis upon which to give the private right of
action for injunction to incumbent management is that in asserting its
self-interest, management is in the best position to protect the interests
of the shareholders if the offeror has violated the securities laws.
98. The Commission was in somewhat of a bind because the defendant cited an earlier amicus
memorandum of the Commission which urged that a target corporation did not have standing to
sue for an injunction assuming that there had been a violation of 10b-5. Memorandum of the SEC
as Amicus Curiae at 10, Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
99. 295 F. Supp. at 1069-70.
100. Id.
101. 409 F.2d at 94546.
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Management can move quickly and efficiently to gather the facts and
disseminate them to the shareholder. By stating the action in that
fashion the private right of action is put in the proper perspective as a
"necessary supplement to Commission action.' ' 2 The relief then
becomes available when there is actual wrongdoing, but is not a tool
of defense to be used anytime inefficient management is threatened by
outside entrepreneuers.
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority of the Second Circuit,
advised future district judges to ponder well whether a violation of the
amendments has been sufficiently proved at the outset. He felt that the
opportunity for doing equity is "considerably better then than it will
be later on."' He pointed out that the flexible powers of equity can
be used to fashion the appropriate relief when it will usually be a
temporary injunction designed to hold the situation in abeyance until
full compliance with the amendments is achieved. However, the district
judges must be "vigilant against resort to the courts on trumped-up or
trivial grounds as a means for delaying and thereby defeating legitimate
tender offers."' 1
The Second Circuit examined the actions upon which the two trial
judges had found violations, but denied relief and determined that in
fact ICC had not violated section 14(e). However, as an alternative
holding the court found that even if there had been a violation of 14(e),
the restricted injunction against further violations was well within the
discretion of the district judge. The majority felt that the cash tender
offer is like a contest and occurs not in a vacuum but "under the
stresses of the market place." The problem is to distinguish the
flagrant situation from the case where a violation has occurred yet
drastic relief is unwarranted. The key to this distinction is
"4materiality." This nebulous concept has been used as the limiting
doctrine in lOb-5 cases and can be successfully applied to cases
interpreting the Williams Amendments.'05 Thus, the test of materiality
for this purpose is "whether any of the stockholders who tendered their
shares would probably not have tendered their shares if the alleged
violations had not occurred."'0 °
102. J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,432 (1964).
103. 409 F.2d at 947.
104. Id.
105. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. deniedsub nom.
Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
106. 409 F.2d at 948, citing Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840,
843 (2d Cir. 1967); see General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 161-62 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
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Judge Friendly pointed out that the statement of purpose required
by Schedule 13D under SEC Rule 14d-l(c) can be as seriously
infringed by an overstatement as to the definiteness of merger plans as
well as an understatement as alleged here. Thus, where plans are not
proved to be definite, an equivocal statement for this item will satisfy
the requirements if it appears to be offered in good faith. He also held
that while a company may choose to correct a misstatement in the
press not attributable to it, it is not required to do so. Thus, the court
excused the incorrect assessment of ICC's position in ELS which
appeared in the Wall Street Journal. The court also found that the sale
of ELS stock took place while ICC was not contemplating a tender
offer and that the interview, which was given before an offer was
decided upon but appeared after the decision to make an offer was
reached and prior to the publication of the offer, was inaccurate but
resulted from "difficulties commonly experienced in answering skilled
and energetic reporters who seek more definiteness than there is, and
the frailties inevitable in human communication ... "107
On balance, this decision seems to be motivated in all respects by
very pragmatic considerations. While the court could have avoided the
issue of standing in view of its holding on the merits, it felt constrained
to discuss the issue. In so doing, it provided the proposition for which
this case will most likely be cited.' The granting of standing to the
target corporation is intuitively just. When it is tempered by the
admonition against recognizing frivolous claims that allow dilatory
litigation to block a tender offer beneficial to the shareholders, it will
encourage dissemination of the maximum amount of information to
the shareholders. In addition, Judge Friendly felt that it was unrealistic
for a tender offeror to be responsible for rumors not attributable to it.
This makes good sense to a point, but in view of the similarity between
the misleading interview answers and the press release of Texas Gulf
Sulphur, it would appear that this is not an entirely accurate statement
of the law."0 9 The point for which this decision is criticized is its lack
of a strong penalty. 10 The Commission submitted a memorandum as
amicus curiae in a subsequent case because of their disappointment
with the instant decision."'
107. 409 F.2d at 951.
108. E.g., MGM v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Pan Ameri-
can Sulphur Co. v. Susquehanna Corp., [Current] CCH SEc. L. REp. 92,473, at 98,233 (W.D.
Tex. May 28, 1969), on appeal, No. 27920 (5th Cir. 1970).
109. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub noma.
Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
110. Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REv. 377, 390-403 (1969).
111. "[Electronic Specialty] failed to give sufficient recognition to principles ...
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B. Tender Offer-Remedies
1. Power.-The federal courts have "the power to grant all
necessary remedial relief" 2 in "all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created" by the 1934 Act or
rules."3 The Commission in its memorandurmi as amicus curiae argued
for the broadest application of that power. Even Judge Friendly in his
circumspect opinion in Electronic Specialty recognized the "variety of
tools" available to the district court."
The availability of an appropriate remedy does not turn on its
specification in a particular statute. In antitrust, for example, the
Supreme Court- has ordered the drastic remedy of divestiture although
it is not specified in the Sherman Act."' Similarly, restitution has been
invoked as a remedy for a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of. 1938 without statutory mandate. The Court in ordering
reimbursement for lost wages stated: "When Congress entrusts to an
equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory
enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic
power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory
purposes."" 6
In the securities field the Supreme Court in J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak,17 made it clear that the language, "the protection of investors"
certainly "implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to
achieve that result.""" The Court cited Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp."' which held .that similar language in the 1933 Act was
"sufficient to fashion a remedy to rescind a fraudulent. sale, secure
restitution and even to enforce the right to restitution against a third
party holding assets of the vendor."'1 Other relief available in addition
to restitution and divestiture has included the appointment of a receiver
establishing the importance of effective remedies as an enforcement weapon to deter future
violations." Memorandum of the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 13, Pan American Sulphur Co. v.
Susquehanna Corp., [Current]'CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,473 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969), on
appeal, No. 27920 (5th Cir. 1970).
112. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,435 (1964).
113. 1934 Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., [Current]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. 92,556 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1970).
114. 409 F.2d at 947.
115. United States v. duPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948).
116. Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960).
117. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
118. Id. at432.
119. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
120. 377 U.S. at 433.
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in an action involving claims under both the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act.12 1 Where a violation of the proxy rules had been shown, the
Commission was granted an injunction requiring the resolicitation of
proxies.'2 Thus, the district court has the power to -fashion whatever
relief is appropriate.
The Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,'2 in discussing the
relief to which shareholders, who proved a corporate merger was
accomplished through a false and misleading proxy statement, were
entitled, stated that setting aside the merger might be an appropriate
remedy, but it is not necessarily required. All factors including fairness
of the terms must be considered. The Court stated:
In selecting a remedy the lower courts should exercise 'the sound discretion
which guides the determinations of courts of equity,' keeping in mind the role of
equity as 'the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public
interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims.
2 1
2. Temporary injunction.-In Pan American Sulphur Co. v.
Susquehanna Corp.,'?' the plaintiff-target corporation (PASCO) and
two of its stockholders sued to temporarily enjoin Susquehanna from
voting 1.8 million shares obtained as a result of a cash tender offer
which was alleged to be false and misleading. In its statement of future
plans, Susquehanna stated that it did not plan to liquidate PASCO,
sell its assets, merge it, or make any other major change in its business
or corporate structure. Susquehanna reserved the right, however, to
adopt or propose such course "if, at some subsequent time, it should
appear that the interest of the PASCO stockholders would be better
served by any of the foregoing courses of action .... ,,121 Secondly,
Susquehanna stated although ownership of approximately 38 percent
of PASCO would not insure any representation on PASCO's board of
directors, Susquehanna expected to request that two existing vacancies
be filled with Susquehanna designees and that "in the opinion of
Susquehanna's Management, 1,800,000 shares should give Susque-
hanna working control of PASCO."127
121. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); cf Aldred Investment Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946) (Investment Company Act of 1940).
122. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
847 (1948).
123. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
124. Id. at 98,536-3-7 (citations omitted).
125. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,473 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969), on appeal,
No. 27920 (5th Cir. 1970).
126. Memorandum of the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 2 & n.2, Pan American Sulphur Co. v.
Susquehanna Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. ,1 92,473 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969),
on appeal, No. 27920 (5th Cir. 1970).
127. Id. at n.3.
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The plaintiffs asserted that Susquehanna intended to obtain a
majority on PASCO's board and to use PASCO as a vehicle for
acquisitions. The court granted a temporary injunction restraining
Susquehanna from voting the stock acquired in connection with the
offer, requiring the composition of the board to remain as presently
constituted, and delaying the annual meeting of PASCO pending the
final trial of the case on the merits. 12 The order was appealed to the
Fifth Circuit.'2 The relief sought by PASCO was an order directing
divestiture of the shares or, in the alternative, removal from the
PASCO board of the three Susquehanna designees, and a permanent
injunction to keep Susquehanna from voting the PASCO shares it had
acquired. The court balanced the hardship of defendant's temporary
loss of voting power pending a trial on the merits against the detriment
that the plaintiff would suffer. The court decided that since plaintiff
had demonstrated a reasonable chance of success at trial the temporary
injunction would issue.
The situation presented by Susquehanna demonstrates one of the
problems facing a court in fashioning adequate relief with respect to
the public and private interests which may be in conflict. The public
generally is interested in the enforcement of the securities laws while
the private interests of the nontendering shareholders, for example, may
militate toward allowing the wrongdoer the benefit of his deception. It
may be that relief will not be sought until after the tender offer because
the falsity of the statements in Schedule 13D and the offer have not
been discovered until that time. On the other hand, the incumbent
management might still have a minority" position in the target and wish
to use a superficial violation of the amendments to regain control
through disenfranchisement of the successful tender offeror-now a
majority stockholder. An example would be where the offeror has
stated that his plans were not to liquidate or make any major change
in its business. After becoming privy to inside information, however,
he finds liquidation of an unprofitable portion of the business
necessary. By this time the price of the stock has probably declined,
and the shareholders will not want to rescind what has been a profitable
transaction.13 The temporary injunction can be used to preclude the
128. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,473, at 98,234, on appeal, No. 27920 (5th
Cir. 1970).
129. The Commission did not file a memorandum on appeal, but did file a statement to the
effect that it adhered to the position taken in the district court. Letter from Phillip A. Loomis, Jr.,
General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Lawrence Ashby, Case & Note Editor,
Vanderbilt Law Review, Dec. 22, 1969.
130. See The Continental Corporation Offer To Purchase Common Stock Of The Diners'
Club, Inc. At $15 Per Share, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13, 1970, at 15 (southwest ed.). Hayes and
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tender offeror from exercising control until the court can determine if
the asserted illegality was material.
The temporary injunction can be used even more effectively during
the tender offer. If it is clear that there has been a material
misrepresentation and the plaintiff will prevail at trial, the temporary
injunction can be used to best advantage early in the tender offer,
before the intervening equities of tendering shareholders have attached.
The flexibility of the temporary injunction was demonstrated in MOM
v. Transamerica Corp. ,13 where the preliminary injunction restraining
the tender offer was conditioned in part upon disclosure of the future
financing plans if and when they were made definite.1 32 After
satisfaction of the conditions upon which the first temporary injunction
had issued, the court refused a new injunction because the plaintiff did
not demonstrate the ability to succeed at trial and because the
irreparable damage which might well fall upon the tendering
shareholders and the offeror outweighed the need fcr enjoining
statements which might be misleading.1
3. Damages.-Judge Friendly rejected damages as an
appropriate remedy with the statement that "no one has had the
temerity to suggest that ICC now be required to raise the price to a
figure it was never willing to pay. ' ' 3u The reply to his argument is that,
assuming a material violation of the 1934 Act, the defendant should
not be allowed to profit by his wrongful conduct. Secondly, the price
was artificially depressed by his manipulative conduct. Most tender
offers, however, will include the three- to five-year trading history of
the stock in question so that the shareholder can compare the offering
price. 35 Surprisingly enough, if the market price of the stock is
depressed, stockholders cannot easily be induced to tender shares even
with a high premium. 3 ' It would also be extremely difficult to show
what the proper price of the stock should be. In addition, the price is
usually higher because of the buying pressure of the offeror's market
Taussig showed that subsequent price performance for both successful and unsuccessful takeovers
failed to keep pace with the market behavior of other stocks in the target's industry during the
following 12 months. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 7, at 147.
131. 303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
132. Id. at 1354.
133. MGM v. Transamerica Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,471, at 98,229
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1969).
134. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir.
1969).
135. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13, 1970, at 15 (southwest ed.).
136. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 7, at 140.
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acquisitions prior to making his offer. 137 If damages were awarded, the
ultimate source of the recovery to tendering shareholders may be the
nontendering shareholders-if a reorganization follows to make them
owners of the corporation that would be liable. The difficulties involved
appear to preclude the award of damages as an appropriate remedy.
4. Rescission.-The offeror in Electronic Specialty voluntarily
offered the tendering shareholders an opportunity to withdraw after full
disclosure. Only one one-hundredth of one percent of the shares were
withdrawn.138 Since the price of the stock will always decline after a
tender offer, it is unlikely that rescission will ever be freely elected by
stockholders. To force such a choice on them would be a drastic
remedy indeed, and to require repurchase at the inflated tender offer
price would inflict a huge loss upon the very people whom the
amendments were designed to protect.
5. Divestiture.-The Commission argued forcefully for
appropriateness of this remedy in its memorandum as. amicus curiae
in the Susquehanna decision. The Commission was troubled by the
rejection of divestiture or at least disenfranchisement of voting'rights
lby the Second Circuit in Electronic Specialty. The Commission stated:
[The Electronic Specialty opinion] failed to give sufficient recognition to the
principles, enunciated in the Supreme Court decisions discussed earlier,
establishing the importance of effective remedies as an enforcement weapon to
deter future violations. In this connection, the court attached undue significance
to the possible monetary loss to the defendant from an order of divestiture or
disenfranchisement.
139
The Commission then cited United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours
& Co. 140 for the proposition that those who violate the Act must forfeit
the benefit no matter how adverse the consequences to private interests.
Divestiture would appear to be the remedy appropriate to only the
most extreme cases. The Supreme Court recognized that in the
securities field-unlike the antitrust area-the legislation is designed to
protect the private interests of the shareholders. Thus, in the recent
opinion of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,' the Court, on a similar
137. Since Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969), requires a statement of all
transactions by the tender offeror, its officers, directors and affiliated persons in the stock of the
target sought by way of the tender offer, within 60 days preceding the offer, the practical solution
has been for the offerors to take a position in the target of less than 10% then effect no transactions
for 60 days prior to the intended tender offer date. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13, 1970, at 15
(southwest ed.).
138. The equivalent of 1,200,000 shares had been tendered while 1100 were withdrawn. 409
F.2d at 944.
139. Memorandum of the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 13, Pan American Sulphur Co. v.
Susquehanna Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 92,473 (WD. Tex. May 28, 1969), on
appeal, No. 27920 (5th Cir. 1970).
140. 366 U.S. 316, 326-27 (1961).
141. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
[Vol. 23
WILLIAMS AMENDMENTS
proposition referred to the passage cited by Judge Friendly when he
affirmed the lower court's denial of divestiture or-disenfranchisement
even if there had been a violation of section 14(e). Although the district
courts have broad equitable powers to fashion appropriate relief, they
must temper that power with the qualities of mercy and practicality.
It is then appropriate for the court to.consider the consequences on
both the corporation and nontendering shareholders. The former- would
be a rudderless ship since incumbent management usually departs after
a successful takeover bid. The latter would see the value of their
investment evaporate. Presumably they chose to remain with the
corporation because they thought the new management more capable
or the price offered for the stock below its intrinsic value and that the
price would soon seek its correct level. In either event, the non-
tendering shareholder will be disappointed. First, the more capable
management is being denied its opportunity, and secondly, with the
market flooded by the release of what is presumably a control block
of securities, the value of his stock can do nothing but decline. In
addition, the tendering shareholder who was misled is no better off. He
has accrued no direct benefit. Reinvestment in the target in its.present
positioi is probably not very attractive. Divestiture would also produce
a huge loss for the offeror, thereby injuring even more innocent
shareholders, .since the sale of the stock could hardly command
anything near the purchase price. 42 The inequity of this remedy is
further demonstrated by the fact that no similar remedy may be used
against incumbent management for equally egregious violations of the
amendments in opposing the tender offer.
6. Deprivation of Voting Rights.-Judge Friendly dismissed this
method of relief as a "disguised method 'of forcing divestiture. '1 3 If
his analogy is correct the same criticisms offered with respect to
divestiture are relevant here. It is correct to say that there is no
comparable remedy with which to deter incumbent management from
similar conduct in the future. Neither divestiture nor
disenfranchisement provides benefit to the tendering shareholders
other than the cold comfort ,of knowing that ,future corporate
wrongdoers will be deterred from a questionable course of conduct.
Judge Friendly observed that as a general proposition it is
unhealthy to leave a minority in control of a -corporation. However,
142. If ICC had been forced to sell its ELS holdings even at the then prevailing market price,
it would have sustained a $15,000,000 loss or approximately 1/3 of the purchase price. 409 F.2d at
947.
143. 409 F.2d at 948.
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this has happened only as a result of disenfranchisement under state
law. 44 While he was correct in his contention that relief can best be
given by preliminary injunction at the time of the tender offer, there
will be situations where the falsity of the statements cannot be known
until after the offer is completed. For this situation, disenfranchisement
may be the only appropriate remedy. It is not necessarily coextensive
with divestiture in that an offeror could hold nonvoting stock as an
investment. Disenfranchisement would allow the offeror the
opportunity of waiting for a better price at which to sell. While this
remedy is drastic, it appears to be the least onerous to all parties at
this stage of the tender offer. It should, however, be reserved for
extreme circumstances or flagrant violations.
C. Creeping Acquisitions and Ten Percent Shareholders
Many of the problems of the tender offer, such as standing and
remedies, are common to the situation presented by individuals who
find themseiv.es described as a "group" in section 13(d)(3) of the 1934
Act. 145 If theG group owns more than ten percent of any outstanding
class of secutities, it must file Schedule 13D within ten days of the
acquisition of ten percent of the equity security.46
In Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 41 some rather sophisticated
investors found themselves so described and clearly in violation of
section 13(d) inasmuch as they had not filed the statement within ten
days. In April of 1969, four of the defendants met with the president
of Bath Industries, a holding company, and offered to purchase his
stock in Bath, which is headquartered in Wisconsin although its
principal operating subsidiaries include a shipbuilding concern in
Maine and a recently acquired floor covering manufacturer in New
Jersey. The defendants asserted that the president had made a poor
impression on investment analysts and balked at moving the corporate
headquarters to New York City. The plaintiff had alleged that the
defendants wished to spin off the shipbuilding subsidiary. This would
be difficult to do'if it were awarded a two billion dollar destroyer
construction contract. Apparently the defendants questioned the
144. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53
A.2d 441 (1947) (shareholder voting pool agreement not specifically enforceable, rather votes of
party in violation of the agreement not counted).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
146. 1934 Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1969); Schedule 13D, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969); see note 49 supra.
147. 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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profitability of the contract, which would require a financing of 65
million dollarsi48 It was suggested by the opinion that the prospect of
a proxy fight at the time the award of the contract was to be announced
would insure that the contract would go to the remaining competitor.
During the summer, the defendants began purchasing Bath common,
convertible preferred, and warrants.149 By September 10, 1969, a list of
shareholders that constituted the group seeking to control Bath had
been reduced to writing and presented to the plaintiff. Defendants had
also engaged a proxy solicitation firm and a public relations firm that
specializes in proxy contests. On September 12, the defendants
requested a shareholder list and demanded a special shareholders'
meeting to elect an expanded new board which gave them the majority
and requested a special shareholders' meeting to be held November 17,
the day prior to the award of the destroyer contract. On September 16,
the defendants met with the board and demanded the election of their
man as chief executive officer and the addition of three nominees to
the board. The board adjourned until September 29 without reaching
agreement. Plaintiff filed this action and requested a temporary
restraining order on September 29. The court, being satisfied that
plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury if defendants were not
restrained, issued the temporary restraining order on the following day.
After an evidentiary hearing, the court stated that it would grant a
preliminary injunction because the plaintiff had made a "showing of
probable cause for ultimate relief on the merits."'"
Between October 17 and October 21, several of the defendants had
filed with the Commission statements purporting to satisfy Schedule
13D requirements. The plaintiff claimed they were false and
misleading. On November 3, 1969, the court enjoined the defendants
from calling a special stockholders' meeting and selecting a new chief
executive officer until all defendants had filed Schedule 13D and the
statements filed were determined to be legally sufficient.
After determining that venue was proper, the court found that the
shareholders constituted a group within section 13(d)(3) and SEC Rule
13d-3.151 The court concluded that they were required to file a statement
148. The company was planning a private placement of $25,000,000 and the sale of
$40,000,000 of debentures.
149. From the early summer, the defendants owned substantially in excess of 10% of the
outstanding common and preferred.
150. 305 F. Supp. at 528; see Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 438 (1881); Chicago
S.S. & S.B.R.R. v. Monon R.R., 235 F. Supp. 984, 985 (N.D. I1. 1964)..
151. 1934 Act § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969); SEC Rule 13d-3, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1969).
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within- ten days after they agreed to pool their voting interests since,
at that time, they held over ten percent of Bath common and preferred
stock. The fact that certain members of the group acquired additional
shares of Bath was only to "further . . insure the success of their
plan.,,52
The court gave a broad definition to "directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner.' ' 3 The court referred to a Commission Release under
section 16(a)'of the 1934 Act to conclude that beneficial owner applies
to anyone who has "[b]enefits substantially equivalent to ownership
. . . [such as] the ability to exercise a controlling influence over the
purchase, sale, or voting of such securities." 54 The House Report
noted:
[Section 13(d)(3)] would prevent a group of persons who seek to pool their voting
or other interests in the securities of an issuer from evading the provisions of the
statute because no one individual owns more than 10 percent of the securities.'5
Having concluded that the defendants violated the Williams
Amendments, the court in balancing the hardships determined that if
the defendants were not enjoined, a strongly contested proxy fight
might ensue causing the shipbuilding subsidiary to lose the large
contract which was to be awarded in the near future. The hardship to
defendants caused by the possible delay in replacing thb chief executive
officer and moving the corporate headquarters was considered
insignificant in comparison. '
- It is inteiesting to note the conflict between section 13(d) as
interpreted by this court and section 14(a) and SEC Rule 14 a-2(a).
The proxy rules exempt "[a]ny solicitation made otherwise than on
behalf of the management of the issuer where the total number of
persons solicited is not more than ten."'57 This exemption is provided
to allow the organization of an insurgent shareholder committee. Yet
this same committee would be in violation of section 13(d) if their
pooled holdings are equal to ten percent, as they must be in order to
consider mounting a proxy fight. In this regard tire Williams
152. 305 F. Supp. at 537.
153. 1934 Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
154. Exchange Act Release No. 7739 (Jan. 19, 1966), 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REp.
26,032, at 19057-4.
155. H.R. REp. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1968).
156. The court said that: "Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the court that it is likely to recover
on its second claim for relief: alleged violations by the defendants of section 14(a) of the 1934
Act .... 305 F. Supp. at 539.




Amendments were supposed to add symmetry to the 1934 Act by
regulating cash tender offers in a manner similar to the regulation of
proxy solicitation; however, it would appear that with respect to
organization of the attack, a heavier burden is placed on the cash
purchaser. Thus, the large shareholder who disagrees with management
is at a greater disadvantage in the context of forming an insurgent
committee than the small shareholder.
The court, here faced with a clear cut violation, tailored the relief
to the situation as well as it could. This decision demonstrates how this
section can be a trap. But by enjoining the shareholders' meeting until
all defendants iad filed sufficient statements, it has delayed the
majority owners from making a business decision in their enterprise
and might force them to be a party to a contract the majority
disfavors. Since the defendants have all entered into settlements with
the plaintiff, they may have felt that the purpose of a proxy fight the
day prior to the award of the contract has been accomplished by the
litigation-a demonstration of the lack of solidarity of management."'8
Clearly, the drastic relief of divestiture was inappropriate here since
Bath had to go to the money market in the event that the contract was
awarded to them. Likewise, damages, rescission, and a permanent
disenfranchisement were not in order. The flexible position adopted by
the court serves all interests. It encourages full disclosure, otherwise a
shareholders' meeting will never be held; yet it is not oppressive to
either the group or other shareholders.
IV. CONCLUSION
Proper considerations for the court faced with either a cash tender
offer or the creeping acquisition-are the policies which are the origin
of the legislation. The first draft provided strong measures for dealing
with those described as white collar pirates. Later versions and much
of the testimony at the Senate Hearings indicated that the new
regulatory measure was not designed to favor either incumbent
management or the offeror. The result is legislation that is designed to
provide full disclosure to the shareholders. While practice would
indicate that white collar pirates are not in abundance, if a case is
presented where the offeror is accurately described by that term, the
machinery is present in the Williams Amendments to deal drastically
with him.
The 1933 Act and the provisions of the 1934 Act should be read
as a unit whenever possible. 5 1 Items that are regulated by the disclosure
158. 305 F. Supp. at 529 n.2.
159. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 313 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); 6 Loss at 3915.
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provisions of the proxy solicitation and 1933 Act registration
requirements should not be material under the projected outlook
section of Schedule 13D. Additionally, a meeting of stockholders that
would be exempt from disclosure requirements under the proxy rules
should not be in violation of the group and disclosure requirements of
section 13 (d).
The courts should be aware of the great trust that has been
bestowed upon them after Borak and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
acknowledged the power to grant virtually any relief that is
appropriate. The rational application of this vast power requires a
constant consideration of the policies discussed earlier. The court must
be satisfied that the plaintiff can ultimately succeed on the merits
before it grants provisional relief. It must bear in mind that the real
benefactor is to be the shareholder, not incumbent management. The
latter can share the benefit only to the extent that it helps discharge
its duty to the shareholder.
When a mere superficial violation occurs, the court can look to
its power of temporary injunction to secure full compliance with the
disclosure requirements. It will be drastic enough in most situations.
The full force of the powers available should be used only when
circumstances call for drastic relief. The remedy should be determined
in the light of all the circumstances, which necessarily involves a careful
analysis of the overall effect of such relief on all the shareholders.
The distinction between the situation which calls for drastic relief
and that which requires little. or no relief turns on the materiality of
the information not disclosed or disclosed in a misleading manner. If
no reasonably prudent investor would have acted differently at the time
of the transaction if a full disclosure had been made, then little or no
relief is needed-perhaps an injunction against future violations. If
there is some question as to what a reasonable investor would do, then
the temporary injunction should issue either upon the condition of full
compliance or a determination of the issues on the merits. If the
situation demonstrates clearly a material omission or misleading
information, so that a reasonably prudent investor would have acted
otherwise if there had been full disclosure, then it is appropriate to
consider drastic relief keeping in mind its overall effect on all the
intended beneficiaries of the Williams Amendments.*
M. DOUGLAS DUNN
* While this Note was at the galley stage, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals revqrsed the
case of Pan American Sulphur Co. v. Susquehanna Corp. The appellate court decided in favor
of the tender offeror. The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 17, 1970, at 18, col. 5. (The case is discussed
in notes 26, 63, 108, 111, 125, 126, 128, and 139 supra).
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